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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CHERISE ROUNDY (BARNEY) BLACK,
Petitioner/Appellee/
Cross-Appellant,
v.
Case No.

990535-CA

V. CRAIG BARNEY,
Respondent/Appellant/
Cross-Appellee.

JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(j) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
In addition to the issues presented for review in the Brief
of Appellant, Cherise Black presents the following issue for
review pursuant to her cross-appeal:
1.

Should Mr. Black's dental practice be considered a

marital asset subject to division?
Standard of Review
The standard of review for all of the issues raised by Mr.
Barney is whether the trial court abused its discretion.
We will not disturb the trial court's findings of fact
in a divorce proceeding unless such findings are
clearly erroneous. On appeal, it is the burden of the
party seeking to overturn the trial court's decision to
"marshal the evidence in support of the findings and
then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial
court's findings are so lacking in support as to be
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'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making
them 'clearly erroneous.'"
Hagan v. Haqan, 810 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
In Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359, 1360 (Utah 1974),
the court outlined the nature of an appeal of the financial and
property interests awarded in a divorce:
In a divorce action, the trial court has considerable
latitude of discretion in adjusting financial and
property interests, and its actions are indulged with a
presumption of validity. The burden is upon appellant
to prove that the evidence clearly preponderates
against the findings as made; or there was a
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting
in substantial and prejudicial error; or a serious
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of
discretion.
STATUTES AND RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS OF
CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL
Application of § 30-3-5(8) of the Utah Code Annotated (1995
Replacement), is of central importance to the appeal, as is Utah
Code Annotated Section 78-45-7.12.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is a divorce action.
Course of Proceedings
Cherise filed a complaint for divorce on March 26, 1997.

R.

1.
Trial occurred on October 27th and October 29th, 1998.
R. 526-27.

Over objection, expert testimony of the value of Mr.

Barney's dental practice was received.

2

R. 994, pp. 234-97.

On

June 8, 1999, the trial court entered Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and a Divorce Decree.

R. 813a-866.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Nontermlnable
1.

Alimony

Cherise's need for alimony is greater than Mr. Black's

ability to provide it, due to the parties' extravagant lifestyle
and to Cherise's inability to support herself at the expense
level she had had in the marriage.
2.

R. 850 (Paragraph No. 32).

Mr. Black's ability to pay alimony in the near term is

limited by his income and his need to pay child support, back
taxes and other obligations.
3.

R. 850, 851 paragraph No. 35).

The alimony award was $2,000 per month for the first

five years and $3,000 per month thereafter.

R. 851, 853

(Paragraph Nos. 36 and 41).
3.

Cherise's total alimony award is reduced if she

remarries but a portion of the alimony awarded to Cherise is
nonterminable.

In the near term, her alimony award is reduced by

25% (to $1,500 per month, versus $2,000) and after five years the
reduction is 33% ($2,000 per month, versus $3,000).

R. 853,854

(Paragraph 42) .
4.

The trial court found that it is unlikely that Cherise

will ever be able to earn sufficient income to support her and
her family in the lifestyle she enjoyed during the parties1
marriage.

R. 850 (Finding of Fact No. 31).
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5.

The trial court made a detailed finding of fact

rding the award of nonterminable alimony:
43. Non terminable alimony is appropriate under
the facts of this case because:
a.
Although the Petitioner was pursuing a
college degree at the time of the parties1 marriage,
she set aside her personal and educational pursuits in
order to raise five children, to be at home with them,
to maintain the household and to enable and assist
Respondent in obtaining his professional degree as well
as develop his professional skills.
b.
The Petitioner devoted all of her attention
to raising the family and supporting the Respondent
during her twenty three years of marriage to the
Respondent.
c.
Both parties had approximately equal earning
capacity, education and experience going into the
marriage. During the marriage, Petitioner was not able
to advance her earning abilities because of her support
of the family and of Respondent's professional
education and business.
d.
Respondent was able to obtain a dental
degree, a graduate degree in dentistry, acquire
seventeen (17) years of dental experience and
establish his own private practice, giving him the
earning ability of $13,500.00 a month, all with the
support of the Petitioner.
e.
Both parties were equal contributors in
advancing Respondent's educational training.
f.
Petitioner assisted in the dental practice
when needed.
g.
Petitioner has minimal earning capacity and
no marketable skills. It is not likely given her age
of forty three (43) years that Petitioner will be able
to ever attain the skills or earning capacity to
support herself at the standard of living she enjoyed
during the marriage.
h.
Petitioner contributed $125,000.00 of her
inheritance into the marriage.
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i.
The parties spent all of the money that
Respondent earned. The parties are left with virtually
no assets to be divided among them at the end of the
marriage.
j.
The parties have no retirement benefits or
savings other than an IRA.
k.
Petitioner is entitled to a non-terminable,
award of alimony because of her contribution to
Respondent's increased earning capacity during the
marriage.
1.
The only way to provide the Petitioner a
compensating adjustment for her contribution to the
greatly enhanced earning capacity of the Respondent is
to award her non-terminable alimony.
m.
Non-terminable alimony will be necessary to
maintain Petitioner at a standard of living similar to
that which existed during the marriage.
n.
This award of alimony is not an award of any
interest in the professional degree of Respondent.
Respondent's income from his practice may change
without affecting the amount of alimony he pays to the
Petitioner.
o.
Respondent has the ability to pay non
terminable alimony which is less than the court ordered
alimony in paragraphs 36 and 41 above.
854-856, Paragraph No. 43).
Child
6.

Support
The trial court made the following findings of fact

rding child support:
23. The parties have three minor children:
Angelina Cherise, 12/21/82; Sandin Craig, 9/18/85; and
Fabione Sadie Marcella, 12/19/87. Respondent should
pay support for these children until each attains age
18 or graduates from high school, whichever occurs
last.
24. The parties' children have become accustomed
to a high standard of living.
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25. The parties' children should be given support
at a minimum to allow them to continue their lives with
some semblance to what they have had in the past.
26. The children should not be punished
financially by this divorce.
27. The children can be and deserve to be
maintained at their accustomed standard of living. They
need higher child support than the maximum provided by
the statutory table.
28. Respondent is able to pay more child support
than would be required under statutory guidelines.
29. Respondent can and should pay an amount equal
to sixteen point three percent (16.6%) of his current
pretax income as child support.
848, Paragraph Nos. 23-29).

Division
7.

of

Property

The trial court made the following findings of fact

rding the tax obligations of the parties:
15. Respondent should be ordered to pay all of
the parties1 past due Internal Revenue Service debt for
the years 1995 and 1996f to hold Petitioner harmless
therefrom and to indemnify Petitioner for any payment
she makes thereon. The IRS debt for 1995 is three
thousand five hundred fourteen dollars ($3,514.00).
The IRS debt for 1996 is sixty two thousand three
hundred twelve dollars (S62,312.00). . . .
16. Respondent should be ordered to pay all of
the parties1 past due state tax debts for the year
1996, to hold Petitioner harmless therefrom and to
indemnify Petitioner for any payment she makes thereon.
The Montana State Tax debt for 1995 is paid in full.
The Montana State Tax debt for 1996 is nine thousand
six hundred fifty seven dollars (S9,657.00). . . .
17. In reaching its finding that all tax debt
payments should be made by Respondent, the Court has
considered the following factors, which the court also
finds:
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a.
The income from which the taxes are assessed
was earned [sic] Respondent;
b.
The Respondent alone has the earning ability
to pay such tax liability;
c.
Petitioner contributed her inheritance of one
hundred twenty five thousand dollars ($125,000.00) to
the marital estate;
d.
Respondent was primarily in control of the
family finances during the marriage while the taxes
were being incurred.
844-846, Paragraph Nos. 15-17).
8.

The trial court made the following findings of fact

rding marital debts:
21. Respondent is ordered to pay all marital debt
incurred prior to April 1997 not specifically addressed
under paragraphs 15 through 20 above, to hold
Petitioner harmless therefrom and to indemnify
Petitioner for any payment she makes thereon. Except
as otherwise ordered by this court, Petitioner is
ordered to pay all debts separately incurred by her
since her bankruptcy in 1998. Respondent is ordered to
pay debts separately incurred by him after March, 1997
in addition to the other debts assigned to him by the
court. This order of marital debt payment is made,
considering the following equities:
a.
The Respondent alone has the ability to pay
such marital debts;
b.
Petitioner contributed her inheritance of one
hundred twenty five thousand dollars ($125,000.00) to
the marriage;
c.
Respondent was primarily in control of the
family finances during
the marriage while the marital
debts were being incurred.
22. The order that Respondent pay marital debt on
behalf of the Petitioner is made by way of further
support and maintenance for the Petitioner and is not
to be considered a property settlement. Respondent
should be ordered to hold Petitioner harmless therefrom
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and to indemnify Petitioner for any payment she makes
thereon.
847,848, Paragraph Nos. 21 & 22).

Dental Practice
9.

Valuation

The trial court made the following findings of fact

respect to the value of Mr. Barney's dental practice:
8.
The court could not consider the following
equities in dividing the dental assets because of the
decision of Sorenson v. Sorenson 839 P2.d 774 (Utah
1992):
a.
Petitioner contributed all of her inheritance
from her grandfather to the family's expenses in lieu
of taking funds from the dental practice for that
purpose.
b.
The court does not find a specific value in
regards to the dental practice because of the decision
in Sorenson v. Sorenson, 839 P.2d 774 (Utah 1992). The
court cannot consider the value of goodwill and
reputation of Respondent's dental practice. Although
only forty thousand dollars ($40,000.00) of the value
of the dental practice is divisible as marital
property, there was substantial evidence that the
dental practice has the value assigned by Petitioner's
appraiser of two hundred twenty seven thousand dollars
($227,000.00) which included goodwill.
c.
The parties have the following education and
work experience:
i.
Respondent completed three years of his
bachelor's degree prior to the marriage.
ii. Petitioner attended college prior to the
marriage of the parties.
iii. The parties were married in June 1974.
iv. Respondent was accepted to dental school at
the University of Iowa beginning the 1974-1975 school
year. Respondent's first year of dental school was
accepted as credit for the fourth year of his
8

bachelor's program and he was awarded his bachelor's of
science degree in 1975.
v.
Respondent's dental schooling at Iowa was
paid for by the United States Air Force through a
health professional scholarship. Respondent's books,
tuition and fees were paid and Respondent received a
$400.00 per month stipend. Both parties worked
part-time jobs during schooling to supplement
the parties income.
vi.

Respondent was awarded his dental degree in

1978.
vii. Respondent also attended the Oregon Health
Science University from 1982 to 1984 and was awarded a
certificate in periodontics in 1984.
viii.Petitioner left her university studies in
Utah to go with Respondent to an out-of-state dental
school.
ix. At the time the parties began having
children, the parties agreed that Petitioner would stay
home to care for the children and the household.
Petitioner spent twenty three years of the marriage
supporting Respondent by caring for Respondent, raising
the parties' five children, and caring for the
household while Respondent pursued schooling and
developed his career. Petitioner stayed at home with
the children throughout the marriage and did not obtain
formal schooling or work experience.
x.
Petitioner has worked sporadically in
Respondent's dental practice substituting for regular
office employees and as a dental assistant when
necessary. Petitioner also helped Respondent set up and
decorate his office.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly found and ordered that a portion
of the alimony to Cherise is to be nonterminable.

The trial

court made the appropriate findings of fact, which, when taken in
their totality, justify the imposition of permanent,
nonterminable alimony.
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A proper consideration of the needs of the children in
setting child support includes considering their general standard
of living.

The trial court properly ordered child support in

this case above the maximum allowed in the table.
There was a proper division of property and marital debts in
the divorce.
The trial court erred in not considering the value of Mr.
Barney's dental practice as a marital asset divisible in the
divorce.
ARGUMENT
I.
Alimony.

The Trial Court Properly Awarded Cherise Nonterminable

Appellant has failed to establish the impropriety of the
trial court's awarding Cherise permanent alimony.

This Court, in

Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69, 74 (Utah Ct. App. 1988),
stated: "The standard of review relating to alimony requires that
we not disturb the trial court's award unless ^such a serious
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of
discretion.' English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977)."
In general, awarding alimony requires a trial court to
consider "the financial conditions and needs of the wife, the
ability of the wife to produce a sufficient income for herself;
and the ability of the husband to provide support."

Id.

The case of Martinez is illustrative and probative.

In that

case, this Court had increased an award of permanent alimony
based on the findings that the marriage had lasted 15 years, Mrs.
10

Martinez had assisted Mr. Martinez in getting his medical degree,
including financial assistance from Mrs. Martinez and her mother,
and based on Mr. Martinez substantially increased earning
capacity which had not yet benefited the Mrs. Martinez and the
family.

While a portion of the court of appeals decision (having

to do with the medical degree and "equitable restitution") was
overturned by the Supreme Court, the award of increased permanent
alimony was not.
The Supreme Court, in Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538,
542 (Utah 1991) gave the following guidance to trial courts on
the issue of awarding alimony, which in the case before it was
permanent:
Usually the needs of the spouses are assessed in
light of the standard of living they had during
marriage. . . .
In some circumstances, it may be
appropriate to try to equalize the spouses1 respective
standards of living. . . . When a marriage of long
duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change
in the income of one of the spouses due to the
collective efforts of both, that change, unless
unrelated to the efforts put forward by the spouses
during marriage, should be given some weight in
fashioning the support award. . . . Thus, if one
spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced
through the efforts of both spouses during the
marriage, it may be appropriate for the trial court to
make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital
property and awarding alimony.
Here, the trial court found that the parties would
have enjoyed a higher family income because of Dr.
Martinez's increased income, which was due to some
extent to the efforts of both spouses during the
marriage. Although Dr. Martinez earned $100,000 a year
before the parties divorced, Mrs. Martinez had not
enjoyed a higher standard of living as a result of that
increased income.
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(citations omitted).
Mr. Black relies almost exclusively on this Court's decision
in Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250 (Utah Ct. Ap. 1993), for his
assertion that the trial court abused its discretion.

The

Johnson case is not controlling and is vastly different in
setting and result from the present case.

Only two findings were

made by the trial court in Johnson in support of its award of
nonterminable alimony.
x

One finding was a generic "alimony was

to assist in the support of [Mrs. Johnson],' and the second was

the impermissible division of Mr. Johnson's career ("'further
assist in allowing [Mrs. Johnson] to share in the benefits of
[Mr. Johnsonfs] professional status.'").

Id.

at 251.

This Court dealt summarily with the first finding:
The [trial] court stated that it granted
nonterminable alimony "to assist in the support of
[Mrs. Johnson]." This is a permissible ground for an
alimony award. See Haumorrt, 793 P.2d at 423 (purpose of
alimony is to maintain the receiving spouse, as nearly
as possible, in the same standard of living that
existed during the marriage); Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d
116, 121 (Utah App. 1990 (same). Standing alone,
however, it is not a sufficient reason to extend
alimony payments beyond the remarriage of the receiving
spouse. To allow nonterminable awards to be based on
this justification alone would violate the statutory
presumption against such awards, since every alimony
award is necessarily based upon this justification.
Id.

at 252.
This Court's ruling on this issue is clear and unassailable.

Mr. Black incorrectly states the Court's holding as: "a recipient
spouse's need for alimony does not support an award of
nonterminable alimony."

Appellant's Brief at 13.
12

The correct

holding is that the spouse's need, standing

alone,

insufficient basis for awarding permanent alimony.

is an
It is,

however, properly considered with all other relevant factors.
Mr. Black essentially argues that this Court consider each
of the 15 separate findings made by the trial court in support of
the award of permanent alimony in isolation.

Thus, he concludes,

no one of the findings is legally sufficient to justify a
permanent alimony award.
Of course, when dealing with an alimony award, which is an
equitable remedy, the totality of the circumstances must be
considered.

When viewed in that appropriate light, the trial

court provides more than sufficient justification for its award
of permanent alimony.
The Black's marriage was of long duration, 23 years.
Cherise sacrificed her own pursuit of a degree (she was enrolled
in college at the time of her marriage to Mr. Black) and a career
to raise children and manage the household.

She assisted in the

development of Mr. Black's practice and was actively involved in
its progression.

She committed a personal inheritance of

$125,000 to the marriage, with nothing now to show for the
investment.
Mr. Black has the ability to pay the alimony awarded.

The

trial court properly considered Mr. Black's earning capacity, his
financial needs and those of Cherise in fashioning an award that
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requires both parties to reduce their spending and attempt to
equalized standards of living so far as possible.
Cherise has limited earning capacity and minimal marketable
skills.

Given her age and her skills, it is highly unlikely

Cherise can ever attain a professional standing similar to Mr.
Black's or approaching that which she could have attained had she
not married and cared for Mr. Black and their children.
Their are virtually no assets to be distributed in a
property settlement of this marriage, due to the parties'
profligate ways.

There are no retirement benefits or savings

other than in IRA.
Cherise will need nonterminable alimony to allow her to
maintain a standard of living more in line with what she became
accustomed to in the marriage.
This is the story told by the trial court's findings of
fact.

The trial court clearly establishes all the necessary

elements to grant permanent alimony.

If the trial court has

abused its discretion in this case, there can be no case in which
permanent alimony is proper.
How different is this from the underlying facts in Johnson?
Dramatically different.

This Court noted that the Johnson's had

"stipulated to an equal division of real and personal property,
yielding $428,000 for her and $428,000 for him.

Each party

received over $200,000 of income-producing personal property."
Johnson at 251.

Without noting an amount, this Court further
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recognized that "The trial court also awarded to Mrs. Johnson
one-half of Mr. Johnson's pension plan."
Unlike the present case, Mr. Johnson's career development
(with Mrs. Johnson's assistance) had already produced significant
tangible assets for division by the parties.

No such assets are

available for division in the present case, making the trial
court's findings of the justification for permanent alimony all
the more persuasive.
The Johnson case and others relied on by Mr. Black contain
almost no findings of fact, or base their decisions for permanent
alimony on impermissible findings.

Thus, in Haumont v. Haumont,

793 P.2d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), this Court overturned an award
of permanent alimony where the sole justification by the trial
court for the award appeared to be that, as a result of her
marriage to the petitioner, respondent lost the same amount in
alimony from a previous marriage.

Johnson, Haumont and others

stand in stark contrast to the thorough and complete findings
made by the trial court in the instant case.
The decision of the trial court should be upheld.
II.

The Trial Court Correctly Awarded Child Support

In Ball v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006 (Utah Ct. App. 1996),
this Court held:

"'In reviewing child . . . support proceedings,

we accord substantial deference to the trial court's findings and
give it considerable latitude in fashioning the appropriate
relief.'. . .

We will not disturb the district court's actions
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unless the court exceeded the limits of its permitted
discretion.7'

Id.

at 1006. (citation omitted).

Utah Code Annotated Section 78-45-7.12 expressly allows
awarding child support payments in excess of the maximum allowed
by the Uniform Guidelines, on a "case-by-case" basis.
Court, in Ball, noted that:

This

"Accordingly, under [this statute],

the trial court had discretion to order 'an appropriate and just
support amount,! so long as it was not less than the highest
level specified in the table for the number of children due
support."

Id.

at 1014.

In this case, the trial court made adequate findings of the
children's needs and these findings were not disputed by Mr.
Black at the time of trial or in his brief on appeal.
findings include:

These

(a) the children are accustomed to a high

standard of living; (b) their support should allow them to
continue their lives with some semblance of what they had in the
past; (c) the children should not be punished financially from
the divorce; (d) the children need higher support than the table
allows; and, (e) Mr. Black is able to provide that support.
These findings stand in stark relief to the dearth of
evidence supporting the trial courts' awards in the two cases
relied upon by Mr. Black.

In Ball, for example, in remanding an

award of child support, this Court noted:
The [trial] court declared the total monthly child
support award in the following words: "Based upon the
above figures [(referring to Mr. Peterson's monthly
gross income)], child support should be awarded to [Ms.
16

Ball] in the amount of $ 1,520.00 pursuant to the child
support guidelines." It appears the trial court arrived
at its total monthly child support award through linear
extrapolation of the child support table. However, the
court provided no findings -- other than Mr. Peterson's
income — to explain how it arrived at $1,520.
Id.

at 1014.

Similarly, in Rhinehart v. Rhinehart, 963 P.2d 757, 760 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998), this Court held:
In this case, both the parties and the trial court
focused on defendant's dramatic increase in income
rather than the children's needs.

A demonstration of an increase in the obligor's income
alone is not sufficient to increase the child support
order. The increase in ability to pay must be
considered in light of the children's actual needs in
fashioning an "appropriate and just" child support
award under section 78-45-7(12).
The trial court did not simply consider Mr. Black's ability
to pay more in child support when it established the amount.

It

specifically found that the children needed the amount awarded to
maintain their life styles and so as to avoid punishing them
financially because of the divorce.
Mr. Black incorrectly contends that more specific findings
were necessary, of a qualitative or quantitative nature, to
establish "need."

He argues that since the children do not have

extraordinary expenses, lessons, private schooling and the like,
that no higher award of child support than the maximum under the
table, is justified.

In fact, "need" is based on accustomed
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standards of living, which is the only lifestyle the children in
a divorce have come to know.
The findings made by the trial court are in complete harmony
with the well-established statements of what constitutes "need"
made by appellate courts.

Thus, in Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d

713, 716 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), this Court reiterated the accepted
definition of need:

"Child support awards should approximate

actual need and, when possible, assure the children a standard of
living comparable to that which they would have experienced if no
divorce had occurred." (citation omitted).
Those were the exact findings made by the trial court, and
Mr. Black has chosen not to marshal any evidence to dispute the
validity of those findings.

The burden is on Mr. Black to

establish in what way the trial court abused its discretion in
making the finding that the children had an accustomed lifestyle
that could only be maintained by the award made.

This he has not

done.
In fact, the evidence is legion and undisputed that the
parties had an extravagant lifestyle, lived beyond their
substantial means, and that the children participated in that
lifestyle right along with the parents.
The trial court's decision regarding child support must be
upheld.
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Ill. The Trial Court Correctly Divided Property and Debts
The trial court's decision as to property divisions
(including debts) is given substantial deference.

The Utah

Supreme Court has noted:
This Court endows the [trial] court's adjustment of the
financial interests of the parties with a presumption
of validity and does not review their values absent a
clear abuse of discretion . . . . We do not lightly
disturb property divisions made by the trial court and
uphold its decision except where to do so would work a
manifest injustice or inequity.
Alexander v. Alexander, 737 P.2d 221, 223 (Utah 1987).
Contrary to Mr. Black's assertion, the trial court not only
may but must

consider all of the parties' circumstances,

including alimony and child support, as it fashions a property
division.
This Court, in Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 68 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991), noted:
In fashioning an equitable property division, trial
courts need consider all of the pertinent
circumstances. Factors generally considered are:
the amount and kind of property to be divided; whether
the property was acquired before or during the
marriage; the source of the property; the health of the
parties; the parties1 standard of living, respective
financial conditions, needs, and earning capacity; the
duration of the marriage; the children of the marriage;
the parties' ages at time of marriage and of divorce;
what the parties gave up by the marriage; and the
necessary relationship the property division has with
the amount of alimony and child support to be awarded.
Of particular concern . . . is whether one spouse has
made any contribution toward the growth of the separate
assets of the other spouse and whether the assets were
accumulated or enhanced by the joint efforts of the
parties.
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In this case, Mr. Barney has been helped in establishing his
practice by the efforts of his wife at home.

Cherise worked with

Mr. Barney through the lean years as he was earning his dental
degree and working for the military.

Mr. Barney began to make

large amounts of money within the last five years of the
marriage.
In Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1382-1383 (Utah 1980), the
court held that "the fact that . . . Plaintiff has not increased
her earning capacity to the extent of Defendant, speaks in favor
of the trial courts distribution [of two-thirds to the wife]." In
the present case, a substantially more drastic difference in
earning capacities resulted than in Kerr:

Cherise has not worked

at all but has raised the family while Mr. Barney obtained his
dental degree, gained his experience and built his practice.
Cherise is now left at 44 years of age with only a high school
education and no marketable skills.
Cherise received $125,000.00 as inheritance from the sale of
her grandfather's farm during the last ten years which money has
been absorbed into the marital estate to help the family pay for
basic expenses during the lean years.
The trial court's decision on property division was
equitable and was supported by the facts and the law.
IV. The Trial Court Should Have Divided the Dental Practice
As a Marital Asset
Mr. Barney's business should be considered an asset of the
marital estate.

In Sorenson v. Sorenson 839 P.2d 774 (Utah
20

1992), the Supreme Court of Utah held that the husband's solo
dental practice had no value to be divided as part of the marital
estate. Justice Durham filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief
Justice Zimmerman joined. The majority held that based on the
appraiser's testimony that the value in the dental practice
depended on the Husband's future earning capacity, his practice
could be not considered as a marital asset. The dissent thought
the Court's holding should be restricted to a finding of no
equity only on the value of the practice which depends on the
future earning capacity of the spouse.

Id.

The present case is distinguishable from Sorenson.

In this

case, the value of the dental practice currently can be separated
from the ongoing ability of Mr. Barney to earn in the future.
This value makes the practice marketable.

Mr. Barney could sell

his practice for a substantial sum and go to work for another
dentist using his skills and abilities to gain a very good income
stream without any ownership in his practice.

The value of the

practice without Mr. Barney's particular skills and reputation is
based upon the combination of the referral base, location,
patient list employees, location, accounts receivable and
equipment which were assembled during the marriage.

Mr. Barney

has built a lucrative dental practice in a highly specialized
area, periodontics.

Not only will Mr. Barney have a substantial

income stream from his dental practice, but he will also take
with him a practice that has value as well.

21

Cherise should be

entitled to share in the value of Mr. Barney's practice.

The

trial court erred in not awarding Cherise a equitable portion of
the value of Mr. Barney's business.
CONCLUSION
The trial court acted properly in its alimony, child support
and property division decisions.

Its order disallowing any

credit to Appellee for the value of Mr. Barney's business should
be reversed.
DATED:

June 7, 2000.
ROBINSON & SHEEN, L.L.C.

E. Jay Sheen
Attorneys for Cherise Black
Appellee/Cross-Appellant
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ADDENDUM

Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(11) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, no addendum to Appellee's Brief is necessary.
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